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Abstract: Chinese economy has been in a state of external imbalance and internal 
imbalance for some years, which certainly has something to do with the 
undervaluation of renminbi (RMB). But Chinese Government hesitates to revalue 
RMB because of the worry that RMB revaluations are contractionary thus have 
negative impact on China's economic growth and employment. The purpose of this 
paper is to empirically assess the effects of RMB real exchange rate on China's output. 
The econometric work of the paper shows that even after sources of spurious 
correlation and reverse causation are controlled for, RMB revaluation has led to a 
decline in China’s output, suggesting that RMB revaluations do be contractionary. 
The paper gives some possible explanations to this finding, and points out that the 
finding does not consequentially imply that China should continue maintaining the 
undervaluation of RMB. 
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In recent years, the renminbi (RMB) exchange rate and China's exchange rate 
policy have received the extensive concern of the international community. Has RMB 
been undervalued? If so, by how much it is undervalued? Should RMB be revaluated? 
These questions have all caused the hot debate at home and abroad. Though there are 
no unanimous conclusion on by how much RMB is undervalued, it is more 
unanimous view of researchers that RMB is undervalued. For example, Goldstein 
(2004 ) estimates that RMB has been undervalued by 15-30% in 2003 according to a 
simple fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) model; Frankel (2004 ) uses a 
modified purchasing power parity method to estimate that RMB was undervalued by 
35% in 2000, and judges that it is undervalued at least that much at present; Shi and 
Yu (2005 ) use a behavior equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) model to draw that 
RMB was undervalued by about 12% on average during 2002-2004; Coudert and 
Couharde (2005 ) use a FEER model to estimate that RMB exchange rate was 
undervalued by 23% in 2003.   
No matter being undervalued or overvalued, exchange rate misalignment 
certainly results in a distortion of the economy that exerts a negative impact on 
economic structure and macroeconomic performance of the economy. For example, in 
recent years, Chinese economy has been in a state of obvious external imbalance and 
internal imbalance
1  which certainly has something to do with the undervaluation of 
RMB. According to the Swan Diagram, a classic framework for analyzing the 
macroeconomic policy of an open economy, RMB revaluation is a direct and effective 
method to resolve the imbalances of Chinese economy (Shi, 2006), but Chinese 
Government seems hesitate to let RMB appreciate
2, would rather adopts other 
measures such as adjusting the rate of tax return of export, relaxing the capital control, 
and adjusting the interest rate or deposit reserve ratio, etc. to deal with external and 
internal imbalances of the economy. 
Why then, even under the situation that there is obviously an undervaluation of 
RMB and Chinese economy suffers from external and internal imbalances, Chinese 
Government still resists RMB revaluation? According to traditional macroeconomics 
textbook model, revaluations are contractionary: at least in the short run revaluations 
will raise the price of the domestic goods relative to the price of the foreign goods 
(namely the real exchange rate appreciation), cause the export to drop and the 
substitution of the home produced goods with the imported goods, and thus reduce the 
                                                        
1  Specifically, external imbalance is evidenced by the large current account surplus and a big 
growth in foreign exchange reserves; the internal imbalance manifests itself in the overheating of 
the economy and the pressure of inflation. 
2  Under the new exchange rate regime, if the monetary authority reduces the intensity of 
exchange market intervention, or widens the band of RMB exchange rate floating, the market will 
promote RMB to appreciate progressively because of the steady expectation of RMB appreciation. 
In this paper, we do not distinguish “appreciation” from “revaluation”.  3
aggregate demand
3. So, the hesitation of Chinese Government is consistent with the 
view of traditional macroeconomic theory. Though Chinese Government has 
announced that China does not pursue too big trade surplus, indicates that Chinese 
policy makers would like to reduce the surplus through various kinds of means, 
Chinese Government certainly worries about that RMB revaluations are 
contractionary as what traditional macroeconomic theory says, thus have a negative 
impact on China's economic growth and employment, even make Chinese economy 
fall into a long time recession as what had happened in Japan during the 1990s. This 
is the main reason why Chinese Government is unwilling to allow RMB to appreciate. 
Under the situation that there is a high rate of unemployment caused by the economic 
reform and economy transition into the market economy, keeping the high rate of 
economic growth and maintaining employment are obviously the higher than all goals 
of Chinese Government. 
Must revaluations be contractionary and devaluations be expansionary? For a 
long time, for example, at least since Hirschman (1949), the economists have realized 
that revaluations are not consequentially contractionary, nor are devaluations 
consequentially expansionary. Marked by Krugman and Taylor (1978), there appears 
a so-called “contractionary devaluations” literature
4. On the demand side, the 
literature emphasizes the expenditure-changing effects of exchange rate change 
ignored by the traditional macroeconomic theory and provides a series of mechanisms 
and channels that devaluation can cause outputs to drop. On the supply side, the 
literature demonstrates the “contractionary devaluations” effect mainly through the 
influence of devaluation on the cost of imported intermediate goods, the cost of wages 
and firm's working capital
5. After the 1994 Mexico currency crisis and 1997-98 East 
Asian financial crisis, the “contractionary devaluations” literature obtains renewed 
attention of economists (Kamin and Rogers , 2000), and has got new development. 
The new development emphasizes the importance of the balance sheet effects in 
explaining the economic recession caused by the devaluation in the financial crisis 
(Frankel, 2005). 
According to the “contractionary devaluations” literature, currency revaluations 
are very likely to have an expansionary rather than a contractionary impact on the 
economy in developing countries. For instance, currency revaluation has the real cash 
balance effect and the real wealth effect: it lowers the domestic price level, therefore 
leading to real cash balance and real wealth increase, which tends to expand personal 
spending (Bruno, 1979, Gylfason and Radetzki, 1991). Currency revaluation also has 
an income reallocation effect (Diaz-Alejandro, 1963, Cooper, 1971, Krugman and 
                                                        
3  This is the expenditure-switching effect of exchange rate change. 
4  This literature is mainly about the exchange rate policy of developing countries. Devaluations 
are usually included in stabilization program of developing countries and balance of payment 
problems in developing countries generally are devaluation pressure. Therefore, the 
“contractionary devaluations” literature mainly investigates the situation of devaluation. However, 
many channels of the contractionary devaluations are equally suitable to the situation of 
revaluation.  
5  See Lizondo and Montiel (1989) for a survey of “contractionary devaluations” literature. Caves, 
Frankel and Jones (2002) provide a simple introduction of 10 kinds of “contractionary 
devaluations” effects.  4
Taylor, 1978): it tends to transfer real income from groups with high marginal 
propensity to saving toward groups with low marginal propensity to saving, causing 
total domestic expenditure to expand. This is because that revaluation raises the real 
wage through reducing the price level, causing the real income to shift from 
entrepreneur to the laborer, and laborer has higher marginal propensity to consume 
than that of entrepreneur. This income reallocation effect is remarkable in developing 
countries, because the laborers in developing countries usually have limited wealth 
and are subject to strong liquidity constraint, so their marginal propensities to 
consume are nearly equal to 1. Moreover, in developing countries, new equipment 
investment usually includes a large amount of imported capital goods, currency 
revaluation will lower domestic prices of those goods, which will help to expand 
investment expenditure and, therefore, total expenditure (Branson, 1986, van 
Wijnbergen, 1986)
6. Finally, currency revaluation will lower the domestic prices of 
imported intermediate goods and raw materials (such as petroleum and minerals) 
which, in turn, will lower the production costs of all final goods (including 
non-tradable goods) and the lowering of marginal costs relative to the prices of final 
goods will lead to increased output and employment (Bruno, 1979, van Wijnbergen, 
1986). Therefore, even if the net effect of revaluation on aggregate demand is 
contractionary (the expenditure-switching effect is large enough to dominate the 
expenditure-changing effect), the existed supply side effect might still makes the 
revaluation to be expansionary. 
Regarding to the empirical literature, the majority research on the relationship 
between real exchange rate and output in developing countries has demonstrated that 
real devaluations were contractionary while revaluations were expansionary, 
suggesting that the channels the “contractionary devaluations” literature revealed are 
important in developing countries. For example, in an influential early research, 
Edwards (1986) uses a reduced form equation model to study a panel data set of 12 
developing countries, and find that devaluations were contractionary in the short-term, 
but turned to be expansionary after one year, and were neutral in the long-term. 
Gylfason and Radetzki (1991) use a macroeconomic simulation method to find that 
for the 12 developing countries studied, devaluations were all contractionary in the 
short-term as well as in the mid-term. Kamin and Rogers (2000 ) use a vector 
autoregression model (hereafter abbreviated as VAR model) to study the relation 
between real exchange rate and output in Mexico, and find that real devaluations were 
contractionary while revaluations were expansionary. Other recent researches, such as 
Hoffmaister and Vegh (1996) on Uruguay, Moreno (1999) on six East Asian countries, 
Akinlo and Odusola (2003) on Nicaragua, and Berument and Pasaogullari (2003) on 
Turkey, all support the “contractionary devaluations” hypothesis. 
What is the relation between RMB real exchange rate and China’s output then? 
Are RMB revaluations contractionary as what textbook says, or expansionary as what 
the “contractionary devaluations” hypothesis suggests? The purpose of this paper is to 
study the effects of RMB real exchange rate on China's output by using a VAR model 
to a sample of 1991q1--2005q3. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
                                                        
6  Those are the expenditure-changing effects of exchange rate change.  5
2 gives a brief historical review of China’s exchange rate regime, the evaluations of 
the RMB real exchange rate and China’s output during the past two decades, in order 
to provide a background for the issues to be discussed; Section 3 describes the model 
to be employed and the data to be used, and discusses the time series characteristics of 
the variables; Section 4 takes an econometric analyses of the VAR models through 
impulse-response function graphs and variance decompositions of forecast errors; 
Finally, section 5 summarizes the conclusions drawn from this research, and discusses 
several policy implications of the research. 
 
 
2ēAn Brief History of RMB Exchange Rate Evaluation and China’s 
Output Fluctuation: 1991—2005 
 
In the early stage of 1990s, what China implemented was a double exchange 
rate system: Official fixed exchange rate coexisted with a market exchange rate 
formed in the swap foreign exchange market. By 1992, up to 80% of the foreign 
exchange transactions were conducted at the swap foreign exchange market and the 
market exchange rate essentially had reflected the demand for and the supply of the 
foreign exchange. Because the swap market exchange rate was higher than official 
exchange rate implying a subsidy to exporter, the double exchange rate system caused 
the unfair competition and resource distortion, and was unfavorable to attract the 
foreign direct investments
7. Against these negative effects, the official exchange rate 
of RMB was increasing (devaluing) constantly, from 4.7 yuan per U.S. dollar in 1990, 
devalued to 5.4 yuan per dollar in 1992, until 5.8 yuan per dollar by the end of 1993. 
In January 1, 1994, China reformed its double exchange rate system by unifying the 
two exchange rates and established a singe and managed floating exchange rate 
system based on market supply and demand. Afterwards, the nominal rate of RMB 
had gone through disconnected small pieces of appreciation, this course went on until 
1997 when the financial crisis of East Asia was outburst.   
Under the situation that the external demand dropped and the currencies of 
China’s principal trade partners devalued against U.S. dollar by a wide margin (except 
Hong Kong), the market participators generally had anticipated that RMB would 
follow those currencies to devaluate. In order to stabilize the regional exchange rates 
and prevent the currencies from competitive devaluation, Chinese Government 
announced against the market expectation that RMB would not be devalued. From 
then on, the RMB exchange rate was fixed at 8.28 yuan per U.S. dollar, and the 
so-called managed float became a de facto dollar peg, this system lasted until July of 
2005. On July 21, 2005, however, China instituted a reform of its exchange rate 
regime by revaluing the RMB by 2.1 percent and terminating its peg to the U.S. dollar 
                                                        
7  Under this kind of system, the foreign investment must be converted into RMB according to the 
official exchange rate first, when the foreign investors need foreign exchanges, however, they can 
only obtain them through the foreign exchange swap market, at the market exchange rate.  6
in favor of a managed float based on a basket of currencies. Under the new exchange 
rate regime, the daily fluctuation of RMB exchange rate is restricted within 0.3 
percent on both side, and the RMB exchange rate has not moved very much because 
of the market intervention conducted by The People's Bank of China (PBOC). Figure 
1 portrays the track of RMB nominal exchange rate against the U.S. dollar during the 


































Contrast to the relative stableness of bilateral nominal rate of RMB, the 
effective real exchange rate (hereafter referred to as the real exchange rate) of RMB 
presented a large fluctuation in the past periods in more than 20 years. As can be seen 
from Figure 2, the real exchange rate of RMB had gone through six different stages 
over the past more than 20 years. (1) 1991q1 --1993q2: The real exchange rate of 
RMB experienced a large amount of depreciation, this is mainly because that the 
nominal rate of RMB had presented a large devaluation; (2) 1993q3 --1998q1: The 
real exchange rate of RMB experienced a large amount of appreciation which is 
mainly because of higher inflation in China during the period and a small extent 
appreciation of RMB nominal rate. After the financial crisis of East Asia, the 
appreciation of RMB real exchange rate is mainly due to the sharp devaluations of the 
currencies of China’s trade partners; (3) 1998q2 --1999q4: The real exchange rate of 
RMB experienced a certain degree of depreciation, this is mainly because that there 
appeared a deflation in China; (4) 2000q1 --2002q1: A certain degree of appreciation 
of RMB real exchange rate appeared in this period, this is mainly the reflection of the 
mild inflation in China and a deflation in the trade partners in this period. The real 
exchange rate of RMB of 2002q1 rebounded to the level of 1997q4; (5) 2002q2 
--2005q1: The real exchange rate of RMB turned to the course of large depreciation, 
this is mainly influenced by the fact that U.S. dollar depreciated largely against Euro,  7
Japanese yen, and other key currencies; (6) 2005q2 and q3: Subject to the influence of 
appreciation of U.S. dollar against Euro and Japanese yen, the RMB real exchange 
rate turned to appreciation state again. 
 



















Similar with the fluctuation of real exchange rate of RMB, China’s real output 
also experienced a large fluctuation over the past more than 20 years. Concerning the 
correlation of the two variables, as Figure 2 shows
8, during the whole sample period 
(1991q1-2005q3), the relationship between the RMB real exchange rate and output is 
not very clear, but since 2000q1, the two have presented an obvious negative 
correlation, namely, appreciations of the real exchange rate have been associated with 
falls of the outputs, while real depreciations have been followed by expansions of the 
output. The relation of real exchange rate and output accords with the forecast of the 
traditional open economy macroeconomics: RMB appreciations are contractionary, 
while RMB depreciations are expansionary.   
However, for the shown correlation between the RMB real rate and China’s 
output in Figure 2, two issues are still need to be clarified: (1) May the tight relevance 
between the RMB real rate and China’s output    be spurious? i.e., is that just 
reflecting the response of both variables to the third external variable and as a matter 
of fact the two variables have nothing to do with each other? (2) If real exchange rate 
and output are really relevant, what then is the causality between them? In other 
words, does the change of the real exchange rate of RMB cause the change of output, 
or, oppositely, does the change of the output cause the change of the real exchange 
rate of RMB? In order to draw the answers to above-mentioned questions, we employ 
pairwise Granger causality test to examine the direction of causality between the 
RMB real rate and China’s output more precisely. The Granger causality tests will 
                                                        
8  See section 3 for the definition and data explanation of the indices.  8
indicate whether a set of lagged variables has explanatory power on the other 
variables. If the computed F-statistics are significant, we can safely claim in 
Granger’s sense that one variable does Granger cause the other variable.   
Table 1 reports the results of the Granger causality test. The result of test on the 
whole sample (1991q1-2005q3) shows that, with 95% level of confidence, the sample 
data rejects the null hypothesis, indicates that China’s output Granger causes the 
RMB real rate and the RMB real rate Granger causes the output as well. Because 
there is a difference on the relationship of RMB real rate and China’s output before 
and after 2000q1, we divide the whole sample into two sub-samples (1991q1-1999q4 
and 2000q1-2005q3) and conduct Granger causality test on two sub-samples 
separately. The results turn out to be surprise: for the first sub-sample, the data rejects 
the null hypothesis with 99% even higher level of confidence, suggesting the output 
Granger causes the real exchange rate and the real exchange rate Granger causes the 
outputs as well; while for the second sub-sample, upon which there seems a strong 
correlation between the output and real exchange rate, the date instead can not reject 
the null hypothesis, showing a strange result that the output does not Granger cause 
the real exchange rate and the real exchange rate does not Granger cause the outputs 
either. That means no variable is helpful in explaining the movement of the other. One 
explanation to this looked strange result may be that there are other variables 
influencing both RMB real rate and China’s output at the same times that has limited 
the usefulness of the pairwise Granger causality test. 
 
Table 1 Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1991Q1--2005Q3 
  Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic  Probability 
  GDP does not Granger Cause REER  55   2.65320   0.04484 
  REER does not Granger Cause GDP   2.85038   0.03419 
Subsample: 1991Q1--1999Q4 
  Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic  Probability 
  GDP does not Granger Cause REER  32   3.69158   0.01833 
  REER does not Granger Cause GDP   9.37632   0.00012 
Subsample: 2000Q1--2005Q3 
  Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic  Probability 
  GDP does not Granger Cause REER  23   0.85897   0.51199 
  REER does not Granger Cause GDP   0.51980   0.72273 
 
 
So, in order to investigate the relation between RMB real exchange rate and 
China’s output further, we employ a VAR model to control the influence of variables 
which may have impacts on both RMB real rate and China’s output, therefore to 
answer above-mentioned questions. The estimated VAR models also let us carry on 
studies on other interested issues. 
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3ēModel and Data 
 
3.1. The Models 
 
We use VAR model to study the relation between the real exchange rate of 
RMB and China’s output. We try to find out whether the correlation indicated by 
Figure 2 is spurious or not, and what is the direction of causality between the real 
exchange rate and output in China. Restricted by the size of the sample, we can't 
include all interested variables within one VAR model
9, so we adopt the modeling 
strategy of Kamin and Rogers (2000) as follows: we estimate a basic model at first, 
and then, expand the basic model through entering another external variable to the 
basic model each time. The basic model includes China's gross domestic product 
(GDP), RMB real exchange rate (REER), China's inflation rate (INFL) and foreign 
gross domestic product (GDPW). In the basic model, we adopt the following orders 
similar to Kamin and Rogers (2000): GDPW, REER, INFL, and GDP
10.  
Being different from Kamin and Rogers (2000), we choose GDPW instead of 
US interest rate as the delegate of the international factor. This is based on the 
following consideration: China still implements the capital controls, therefore, the 
relation between US interest rate and that of China is not very close; on the other hand, 
after fulfilled the RMB convertible for current account transactions and formally 
joined the World Trade Organization, the openness of China's real economy is 
increasing constantly, the ratio of foreign trade to GDP in China has reached a high 
level of 70% at present. In this situation, the business cycles of the trading partners 
have important influence on the business cycle of China through the channel of 
import and export: the change of trading partner’s output exerts an influence on the 
current account of China through the channel of import and export, and then cause the 
change of the real exchange rate of RMB, which influences the adjustment of the 
price level, causing China’s output to change. 
The basic model is too frugal to allow us to investigate more comprehensive 
influence of the variables that influence both the real exchange rate and the output, it 
may not be very efficient to study the spurious relevant problem, so we enter one 
endogenous variable each time into the basic model, and estimate 3 more VAR 
models in addition. That let us see whether our final results are robust or not, at the 
same time let us control the size of the VAR model within the appropriate level 
according to the sample. The models can be expressed in the forms of unrestricted 
VAR model as follows: 
1
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9  Because a VAR model involves quite a lot of parameters to be estimated, introducing too many 
endogenous variables will cause serious loss of the degrees of freedom, influence the statistic 
dependability of the results. 
10  Through trial, we find that the specific variable orders do not have remarkable influence on the 
result of the basic model.  10
Where, 
1 (, , , ) tt t t t Y GDPW REER INFL GDP ′ =  
2 (, , , , ) tt t t t t Y GDPW GOV REER INFL GDP ′ =  
3 (, , 2 , , ) tt t t t t Y GDPW REER M INFL GDP ′ =  
4 (, , , ,) tt t t t t Y RUS GDPW REER INFL GDP ′ =  
l k indicates the lags of  l-th VAR modelđ
l
i A   are parameter matrices of  l-th VAR 
model to be estimatedđ
l
t ε   is a random residual vector of  l-th VAR modelđ
l o is the 
zero mean vector of 
l
t ε đand 
l Ω is a covariance matrix of 
l
t ε . The fourth model has 
included US interest rate so as to investigate the international interdependent between 
Chinese economy and the world economy and to assess the importance of external 
shocks on Chinese economy.   
 
 
3.2. The Data 
 
The data are quarterly one; the sample interval is 1991q1--2005q3. 1991q1 is 
the earliest time for which the quarterly GDP data is available in China, The GDP 
data of 2005q4 is collected according to a new statistical method and without 
comparability with the data in the past, therefore, we exclude it from our sample. 
Except for inflation rate, variables are the real ones, US real interest rate is obtained 
by subtracting US inflation rate from the nominal interest rate, and other real variables 
are drawn from the nominal ones divided by consumer's price index. The base period 
is 1992. 
The GDP data is detrended one, which is calculated as the residuals from a 
regression of the logarithm of quarterly real GDP on a constant and a quadratic time 
trend because the regression with a quadratic time trend has higher degree of 
goodness of fit than one with a linear time trend. REER stands for RMB real 
exchange rate index with a rise indicating an appreciation. China’s inflation rate, 
INFL, is obtained by differencing the logarithm of consumer's price index. GOV 
expresses the expenditure of Chinese Government. M2 is China's broad money supply. 
The foreign gross domestic product, GDPW, is calculated according to the 
trade-weighted average of gross domestic product index of 14 principal trade partners 
of China. RUS indicates US real interest rate of 3 months Treasury bill. Except for 
INFL and RUS, variables are in the logarithm. GDP, GOV, INFL and GDPW have 
been seasonally adjusted. REER data and data of other countries or regions come 
from IMF international finance statistics database. The data of China’s variables 
except REER come from State Statistics Bureau, the People's Bank of China, China  11
Ministry of Finance and General customs of China. Taiwan GDP annual data comes 




3.3. The Time Series Characteristics of the Data 
 
Because many macroeconomic variables are not stationary, to avoid spurious 
regressions, we need to test if the time series of relevant variables in our models are 
stationary or not. If the variables turn out to be nonstationary, we need to know 
further whether there exist long ran steady relationships among those endogenous 
variables or not. We take the unit root tests and cointegration tests for those purposes 
below.  
 
A. Unit Root Tests 
 
We use both the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron 
test for unit root tests. Table 2 reports the results of the unit root tests of all relevant 
variables in our models. For the level variables, both tests reveal that we cannot reject 
the presence of unit root, which shows these variables are all non-stationary; on the 
other hand, Phillips-Perron test rejects the null hypothesis of presence of unit root at 
the 1 per cent level of significance for the first differences of all variables, while ADF test 
rejects the null hypothesis of presence of unit root at the 1 per cent level of significance for 
the first difference of all variables except GDP. ADF test cannot reject the presence of 
unit root for the first difference time series of GDP. Here, we adopt the result of 
Phillips-Perron test for GDP, and therefore assert that all variables in our models are 
the first order integrated variables, namely variables of I (1). 
 
Table 2 Unit Root Tests 
Level First  Difference   
ADF Test  Phillips-Perron Test ADF Test  Phillips-Perron Test
GDP  -1.53* -1.45* -1.88* -9.26** 
REER -1.27* -1.37* -5.56**  -5.69** 
INFL  -1.24* -1.89* -12.00**  -11.38** 
GDPW  -1.01* -1.00* -6.98**  -7.00** 
GOV 1.12* 1.21* -6.10**  -10.10** 
M2 0.20*  -0.44*  -3.91**  -6.01** 
RUS  -1.61* -1.87* -6.42**  -6.44** 
* denotes that the hypothesis that the variable contain unit root can not be rejected at the 10 per 
cent level of significance. 
** denotes the rejection of the hypothesis that the variable contain unit root at the 1 per cent level 
of significance.   
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B. Cointegration Tests 
 
Because all variables in our models are variables of I (1), we need to further test 
if there are cointegration vectors for each model. We implement VAR-based 
cointegration tests using the methodology developed in Johansen (1995). For that 
purpose, we need to estimate the unrestricted VAR models first. We take the familiar 
two-stage approach to estimate the VAR models, at the first stage, the variables are 
regressed on lags of all the variables in the system, at the second stage, the Cholesky 
decomposition technique used by Sims (1980) is used to orthogonalize the residuals. 
According to AIC criterion and SC criterion, the different numbers of lags are tried 
for each VAR model, and the optimum lags are 4 for all four models. Table 3 reports 
the results of Johansen cointegration tests based on the estimated unrestricted VAR 
models. The results indicate that there is at least one cointegration vector for each 
VAR model.   
 
Table 3 Cointegration Tests for Alternative Specifications 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue   λ-Trace Statistics    λ-Max Statistics   
Model 1: Series: GDPW REER INFL GDP 
None  0.552047  78.58229 *  44.16865 * 
At most 1  0.408896  34.41363 *  28.91697 * 
At most 2  0.079248  5.496661  4.541031 
At most 3  0.017225  0.955630  0.955630 
Model 2: Series: GDPW GOV REER INFL GDP 
None  0.691449  131.8465 *  64.67274 * 
At most 1  0.435870  67.17373 *  31.48586 * 
At most 2  0.363049  35.68787 *  24.80847 * 
At most 3  0.171236  10.87941  10.33006 
At most 4  0.009938  0.549346  0.549346 
Model 3: Series: GDPW REER M2 INFL GDP 
None  0.719092  133.2365 *  69.83512 * 
At most 1  0.512575  63.40134 *  39.52398 * 
At most 2  0.300597  23.87735  19.66403 
At most 3  0.070371  4.213322  4.013361 
At most 4  0.003629  0.199961  0.199961 
Model 4: Series: RUS GDPW REER INFL GDP 
None 0.670747  112.4157  *  61.10101  * 
At most 1  0.380508  51.31474 *  26.33704 
At most 2  0.274396  24.97769  17.64129 
At most 3  0.112526  7.336406  6.565672 
At most 4  0.013916  0.770734  0.770734 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level of significance. 
Note: Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 3 
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4ē  Estimation and Econometric Analysis of the Models   
 
Because all variables in our models are variables of I (1) and there is at least 
one cointegration vector for each model, it is appropriate for us to estimate the 
restricted VAR models that restricts the long-run behavior of the endogenous 
variables to converge to their cointegrating relationshipsđnamely, the vector error 
correction (VEC) models. Estimation of a VEC model is carried out in two steps. In 
the first step, we estimate the cointegrating relations from the Johansen procedure as 
used in the cointegration test. We then construct the error correction terms from the 
estimated cointegrating relations and estimate a VAR in first differences including the 
error correction terms as regressors. The VEC models to be estimated have forms as 
follow: 
, ⎡ ⎤ ⎦ ⎣ ∑
l k- 1
ll l l ll l l l
t t-1 i t-i t t
i=1
Y = ECM + Y + , IID o l = 1,4 ∆α Γ ∆ε ε Ω ∼  
whereğ
l
t-1 ECM  is the error correction termđreflecting the long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the variables. The coefficient vector
l α reflects how fast the 
deviation from long-run equilibrium is corrected through a series of partial short-run 
adjustments. 
l
i Γ  are parameter matrices of variables in differences, the elements of 
them reflect the short-term effect of the variables on a dependent variable. The 
estimated VEC models give variance decompositions and impulse-response functions. 
Then, the tables of variance decompositions and the graphs of impulse-response 
functions are used to analyze the relation between RMB real rate and China’s output, 
and other relations that we are interested in.   
 
 
4.1. The Analysis Based on the Variance Decompositions 
 
Table 4-- Table 7 provide the results of the variance decompositions of GDP, 
RMB real rate, and inflation in four VEC models respectively. The variance 
decompositions give the fraction of the forecast error variance for each variable that is 
attributable to its own shocks and to shocks in the other variables in the system. For 
example, in Table 4, the figures in the first line (1-quarter forecast horizon) of top 
panel express that the fractions of the forecast error variance of GDP attributable to 
shocks in foreign GDP, RMB real rate, inflation, and GDP itself are 4.37%a46.59%a
0.79%and 48.25% respectively. In other words, at the 1-quarter forecast horizon, 
4.37% of the variance in GDP is attributable to shocks to foreign GDP, so are the 
explanations of the rest three figures. The following results can be drawn from the 
variance decompositions:    14
First, in the source of variation in GDP forecast error, “own shocks” is the first 
most important source at the 1-quarter forecast horizon, which accounts for about 
50% of the forecast error variance in the models, while RMB real rate shock is the 
second most important source of variation in GDP at the 1-quarter forecast horizon, 
which accounts for 34%-47%. Beginning from the third quarter, however, the RMB 
real rate shocks become the first most important source of variation in GDP in all 
models except for model 2, which accounts for 37%-66% of the GDP error variance; 
In the medium and long-term horizon (two year after), the predominant source of 
variation in GDP forecast errors are the RMB real rate, while the contribution of the 
“own shocks” can be neglected. No matter what time horizon it is, the inflation 
innovations have no power in explaining the GDP forecast error variance, but the 
shocks of other variables such as government expenditure, money supply, foreign 
GDP and U.S. interest rate do have relatively large power in explaining the error 
variance of GDP, indicating that there can be a spurious correlation if one studies the 
correlation between RMB real rate and China’s output directly, without controlling 
the source of these variables. 
Second, in the source of variation in RMB real rate forecast error, “own 
shocks” account for 94%-100% of the forecast error variance at the 1-quarter forecast 
horizon. In the medium and long-term horizon (two year after), the “own shocks” is 
still the predominant source of variation in RMB real rate forecast errors in all models 
except for model 2. What merits attention is that, no matter what time horizon it is, 
the innovations of both GDP and inflation have little power in explaining the RMB 
real rate forecast error variance. However, the shocks of other variables such as 
government expenditure, money supply, foreign GDP and U.S. interest rate do make 
certain contribution to the error variance of RMB real exchange rate in the medium 
and long-term horizons.   
Third, in the source of variation in inflation forecast error, “own shocks” is the 
predominant source of variation in forecast errors at the short-term (in one year ) 
horizon, which accounts for 60%-80% of the forecast error variance in all models 
except for model 3 which includes money supply. In the medium and long-term 
horizon (two year after), however, the RMB real rate shocks become the first most 
important source of variation in inflation in model1 and model 4 and the second most 
important source in model2 and model 3, while the foreign GDP shocks in turn 
become the first most important source of variation in inflation in model2 and model 
3. Besides, the shocks of government expenditure, money supply, and U.S. interest 
rate also have relatively large power in explaining the error variance of inflation. It is 
worth notice that no matter what time horizon it is, the GDP innovations hardly have 
power to explain the inflation forecast error variance. 
In conclusion, the results drawn from the analysis of the variance 
decompositions suggest that (1) at all time horizons, the shocks to the real exchange 
rate of RMB have remarkable effect on the variation in China’s GDP, which is true 
for all models, suggesting the possibility of the spurious correlation between the RMB 
real rate and China’s output can be excluded; that (2) at all time horizons, the shocks 
to GDP have little effect on the variations in both RMB real rate and inflation, which  15
is true for all models, suggesting the possibilities of reverse causation running from 
the GDP to the RMB real rate and running from the GDP to the inflation can be 
excluded; and that (3) shocks to foreign GDP and US interest rate all have remarkable 
effects on the variation in GDP, and the magnitudes of them are no less than those of 
internal shocks (to government expenditure and money supply), which reflect the 
structure characteristic of China's outward-looked economy. 
 
 
4.2. The Analysis Based on the Impulse-Response Functions 
 
The variance decompositions allow us to appraise the relative importance of 
contribution of different shocks to the variance of a particular variable; on the other 
hand, the impulse-response function provides a useful tool to assess the direction as 
well as the magnitude of response of a variable to various kinds of shocks. Because 
the graphs of impulse-response functions of VEC model given by the Eviews software 
which we use are that of level variables, and the level variables in our models are 
nonstationary ones, the analysis based on the impulse-response functions of VEC 
models is meaningless. Therefore, we estimate the unrestricted VAR models in first 
differences and conduct the econometric analysis based on the impulse-response 
graphs of those models. Figure 3-- Figure 6 provide the graphs of impulse-response 
functions of four VAR models respectively. Model 1 contains 4 variables, thus there 
should be 16 impulse-response function graphs, other three models all contain 5 
variables, and thus there should be 25 impulse-response function graphs for each of 
the three models. In each Figure, the responses of a particular variable to a one-time 
shock in each of the variables in the system are displayed. As page space is limited, 
we have only reported part of the graphs which are interested to us. From the analysis 
of those impulse-response function graphs, the following results can be drawn: 
First, when one standard deviation positive (appreciation) shock to RMB real 
rate takes place, there is an obvious decline of contemporaneous GDP. In mid term (2 
to 3 years), the contractionary impact is weakened to some extent but still obviously 
exists. After 12 quarters, the impacts of RMB real rate shock on output turn to be 
neutral. This contractionary effect of RMB appreciation occurs in all models 
estimated, suggesting the robustness of the result. This result is in contrast with that of, 
say, Edwards (1986) and Kamin and Rogers (2000). In Edwards (1986), for 12 
countries studied, devaluations (revaluations) were contractionary (expansionary) in 
the short term, but after one year, devaluations turned out to be expansionary; In 
Kamin and Rogers (2000), for Mexico, devaluations (revaluations) were 
contractionary (expansionary) in short term as well as in mid term. However, in China, 
as the result here indicates, devaluations (revaluations) are expansionary 
(contractionary) in both short term and mid term. 
Second, one standard deviation shock to GDP has no impact on 
contemporaneous RMB real exchange rate, but in mid term, the shock causes the real 
rate of RMB to present certain fluctuation. This effect of output shock occurs in all 
models estimated, suggesting the robustness of the result. Because the measure of the  16
impulse-response graphs of RMB real rate to other variable shock is only about 1/10 
relative to the measure of those of GDP, we can think that the magnitude of impact of 
output shocks on RMB real rate are much less than the magnitude of impact of RMB 
real rate shocks on the output.   
Third, one standard deviation shock to RMB real rate has no obvious impact on 
foreign GDP, nor does one standard deviation shock to GDP. However, one standard 
deviation shock to foreign GDP has a remarkable impact on China’s GDP, so does 
one standard deviation shock to US interest rate. After one standard deviation positive 
shock to foreign GDP takes place, China’s GDP rises remarkably, in model 4 which 
includes US interest rate, the impact of foreign GDP shock on China’s GDP is even 
greater than that of real exchange rate of RMB; after one standard deviation shock to 
US interest rate takes place (in model 4), China’s GDP drops remarkably, the 
magnitude of the effect of US interest rate is equal to that of real exchange rate of 
RMB. 
Fourth, According to Figure 5, one standard deviation positive shock to money 
supply has little impact on GDP, but does cause the RMB real rate to depreciate in 
short term and mid term. According to Figure 4, one standard deviation positive shock 
to government expenditure has a little impact on GDP, but the magnitude of the effect 
is less than that of other variables, such as, RMB real rate, foreign GDP and US 
interest rate. One standard deviation shock to government expenditure has obvious 
impact on RMB real rate, causes the RMB real rate to depreciate in short and mid 
terms.  
In conclusion, the results drawn from the analysis of impulse-response functions 
suggest that the RMB real appreciation shock has remarkably contractionary impact 
on output.  After controlling the influence of other variables, the RMB real 
appreciation shock still causes GDP to decline remarkably, which excludes the 
spurious correlation between the real exchange rate and output. The results seem also 
support the guess that the direction of the causality between the RMB real rate and 
China’s output run from the former to the latter. Finally, the external shocks have 
remarkable effects on China’s output and the magnitudes of the effects are greater 
than those of internal shocks such as government expenditure and money supply. One 
possible explanation to this is as follows: China has pursued an export-oriented 
development strategy since 1978, which has made the export a major contributor of 
the growth of China’s output. For example, the contribution of exports to GDP growth 
has reached a high level of 80% in the first three quarters of 2005. At the same time, 
domestic demand, especially consumption demand, has developed lags behind due to 
institutional and policy reasons, such as incomplete social security facility and 




5. Conclusion and Policy Implication 
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This paper has investigated the relationship between the RMB real exchange 
rate and China’s output by using the VAR model technique. The econometric work of 
the paper shows that even after sources of spurious correlation and reverse causation 
are controlled for, RMB real revaluation has led to a decline in China’s output, 
suggesting that currency revaluations are contractionary in China, as the traditional 
open economy macroeconomics forecasts. The possible explanations of this 
conclusion are as follows: 
First, in the existing research on “contractionary devaluations” effect in 
developing countries, devaluations usually take place under an abnormal environment 
of currency or financial crisis, and thus have been associated with economic recession, 
but RMB devaluations did not happen in case of currency or financial crisis till now; 
Secondly, the urban economic reform begun at the early 1990s makes many people 
lose their jobs and traditional benefits on medicare, pension and education, etc. which 
strengthens the motive of precautionary saving of household in urban and township 
areas. Under that situation, the income reallocation effect as well as the real cash 
balance and the real wealth effects of currency appreciation will not play a very great 
role. 
Third, China has absorbed a large amount of foreign direct investment for many 
years. As the result, the technological progress and production capacity of China’s 
manufacturing industry have been promoted rapidly, the substitutability of home 
produced capital goods to imported goods has been strengthened, therefore, the effect 
of RMB exchange rate on domestic investment expenditure is not clear; Fourth, one 
condition that devaluation can lead to a reduction in national output is that imports 
initially exceed exports (Krugman and Taylor, 1978), China’s trade balance has been 
in the favorable surplus for over 20 years in the past except for 1993, therefore does 
not satisfy that condition; 
Finally, Because of the characteristics of processing trade in China’s 
manufacturing industry, and administrative controls on prices (especially on those of 
service sector), the supply side effect of RMB exchange rate on output is also 
uncertain. In a word, it seems that the expenditure-changing effect and supply side 
effect of RMB exchange rate are not remarkable in practice, therefore, the effects of 
RMB exchange rate on China’s output are mainly embodied through the 
expenditure-switching effect as traditional macroeconomic theory emphasized, in that 
situation, the revaluations of RMB are likely contractionary.   
What policy implications can we draw from the conclusion that currency 
revaluations are contractionary in China? First of all, the conclusion that revaluations 
are contractionary in China does not mean that China should continue maintaining 
RMB exchange rate undervalued. Because the undervalued RMB has already caused 
Chinese economy to run into internal and external imbalances in the past several years. 
Figure 2 tells us, China’s real GDP has been running above its long-term trend since 
2003, and this kind of deviation is expanding. Indeed, the situation of the overheating 
of Chinese economy is obvious. Trade surplus and foreign exchange reserve are 
increasing rapidly, which results in excess money supply and the inflation pressure, 
causing the operation of the monetary policy of the PBOC to be more and more  18
difficult. It is no doubt that continuing the undervaluation of RMB exchange rate will 
further aggravate the imbalances of Chinese economy.   
Secondly, the conclusion that revaluations are contractionary in China implies 
that relative to other effects of exchange rate change, the expenditure-switching effect 
is predominant in China; therefore it is effectual to use the orthodox Swan Diagram to 
analyze macroeconomic policy issues in China
11. According to the Swan Diagram, 
allowing RMB to appreciate is helpful for Chinese economy to realize internal and 
external balances (Shi, 2006). Along with the revaluation of RMB, the public 
expenditure should be expanded, if necessary, to maintain the certain rate of growth 
and employment. However, the public expenditure should be spent on the service 
sector such as health and medicine, education, environment, public service facilities 
and social security etc. which not only have a direct impact on expanding total 
demand but also make it favorable for stimulating consumption by the household. The 
public expenditure spent on the service sector will not increase new export capacity, 
and thus is not in conflict with the external balance purpose. 
Third, There exists a structural weakness of Chinese economy (overly 
dependent on external demand, and insufficient development in domestic-market 
oriented industries, such as service industries), which makes Chinese economy easy to 
be influenced by the external shocks. An undervalued RMB subsidizes export sectors 
but represses domestic-market oriented sector that will further aggravate the structural 
weakness of Chinese economy. The RMB revaluation aiming at eliminating the 
misalignment of RMB exchange rate will provide the domestic market oriented 
industry with market incentives because of the rising prices of non-tradable goods 
relative to tradable goods. This adjustment (plus increased public spending on the 
service sector) will channel more resources into the domestic-oriented industry, 
making it favorable for China to realize the adjustment of the industrial structure and 
the change toward a consumption-led economic growth model. Therefore, even if the 
fiscal tool in China is restricted for some reasons, thus can not stabilize fully the 
aggregate demand, Chinese Government still needs to balance the short-term costs 
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Table 4ē Variance Decompositions from VEC Model 1 
Variance Decomposition of GDP: 
 Period  S.E.  GDPW  REER  INFL  GDP 
 1   0.775573   4.370216  46.58572  0.798447  48.24561 
 2   0.944725   2.980558  56.18312  0.968377  39.86794 
 3   1.124277   3.610610  66.10118  1.353943  28.93427 
 4   1.263125   5.471985  70.15063  1.373777  23.00361 
 8   2.273608   3.467035  87.22159  0.621161  8.690219 
 12   3.088454   2.235682  92.13450  0.337321  5.292493 
 20   3.915777   1.442643  93.86993  0.244929  4.442500 
Variance Decomposition of REER: 
Period S.E. GDPW  REER  INFL GDP 
1  0.026073 0.164080 99.83592 0.000000 0.000000 
2  0.040873 0.298108 98.94597 0.754256 0.001668 
3  0.051703 0.203087 98.96799 0.819108 0.009812 
4  0.063659 0.594874 97.88038 1.081734 0.443011 
8  0.096222 4.834455 93.69062 1.239355 0.235575 
12  0.108382 14.10888 84.41201 1.164210 0.314906 
20  0.122145 27.39410 70.24748 0.988097 1.370323 
 Variance Decomposition of INFL: 
Period S.E. GDPW  REER  INFL GDP 
1  0.690536 18.77404 0.000634 81.22533 0.000000 
2  0.699719 18.28927 1.507263 79.44101 0.762457 
3  0.726061 21.57728 1.453847 76.25564 0.713232 
4  0.804482 17.72315 18.80361 62.69748 0.775764 
8  1.227127 9.719377 59.65465 28.57313 2.052839 
12  1.437955 15.63477 60.76972 21.90944 1.686068 
20 1.754259  31.11310  52.64795  14.80376  1.435201 
 Cholesky Ordering: GDPW REER INFL GDP 
  26
Table 5ē Variance Decompositions from VEC Model 2 
Variance Decomposition of GDP: 
Period S.E. GDPW  GOV REER INFL  GDP 
1  0.621295 0.102633 0.445433 35.46201 2.095631 61.89429
2  0.791767 7.594580 6.086064 28.42103 4.296199 53.60213
3  0.931901 7.895643 10.12387 32.03727 5.933878 44.00934
4  1.085273 6.766615 18.83194 31.40813 7.727984 35.26533
8  2.338872 22.25005 21.74483 32.73131 4.826227 18.44758
12  3.695959 29.16098 22.53249 31.28438 3.428024 13.59413
20  6.077442 35.77575 22.34799 28.74934 2.463364 10.66356
Variance Decomposition of REER: 
Period S.E. GDPW  GOV  REER  INFL GDP 
1  0.022398 3.552234 2.554186 93.89358 0.000000 0.000000 
2  0.035182 7.026435 13.40865 78.10514 0.109965 1.349814 
3  0.047301 9.426063 23.33817 64.45479 0.146382 2.634596 
4  0.060839 12.80858 27.30470 57.94018 0.148814 1.797719 
8  0.108122 34.16809 22.89513 40.05577 0.145212 2.735800 
12  0.133279 45.42971 19.36748 32.09955 0.109263 2.993993 
20  0.142690 50.47951 17.61867 28.90657 0.110319 2.884936 
Variance Decomposition of INFL: 
Period S.E. GDPW  GOV REER INFL  GDP 
1  0.701229 15.72309 1.320417 2.217637 80.73885 0.000000
2  0.722414 15.40452 1.856942 5.474855 76.08796 1.175732
3  0.753661 17.37946 1.711941 5.404093 74.40246 1.102048
4  0.795953 15.66971 1.722214 13.11879 68.31063 1.178656
8  1.233522 23.74703 15.94339 29.90568 29.21842 1.185482
12  1.608544 37.09667 17.14240 27.34072 17.38312 1.037094
20  1.782811 41.89785 16.81064 25.24525 14.61405 1.432209
 Cholesky Ordering: GDPW GOV REER INFL GDP 
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Table 6ē Variance Decompositions from VEC Model 3 
Variance Decomposition of GDP: 
 Period  S.E.  GDPW  REER  M2  INFL  GDP 
 1   0.663428   0.006036  39.27720  8.965800  0.085416   51.66555
 2   0.868649   8.811980  35.20407  16.29305  1.085760   38.60514
 3   1.047824   7.192981  43.45374  19.64586  1.975402   27.73202
 4   1.201502   5.586482  47.64405  22.88758  2.547852   21.33403
 8   2.383419   6.719923  66.22886  17.72359  1.826166   7.501466
 12   3.565230   6.594700  71.07709  17.06023  1.313478   3.954501
 20   5.131319   6.890153  72.17116  17.42679  1.101161   2.410733
Variance Decomposition of REER: 
Period S.E. GDPW  REER M2  INFL GDP 
1  0.025289 0.776685 99.22332 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
2  0.038333 2.585024 96.32034 0.894008 0.200514 0.000117 
3  0.048833 3.458183 92.15226 4.249073 0.126679 0.013806 
4  0.062075 5.251369 88.37941 5.816164 0.078450 0.474609 
8  0.107157 7.458667 84.24899 7.825906 0.129016 0.337424 
12  0.124362 8.007897 82.89627 8.689335 0.114839 0.291654 
20  0.126859 8.092359 82.58001 8.884336 0.128478 0.314819 
Variance Decomposition of INFL: 
Period S.E. GDPW  REER  M2  INFL  GDP 
1  0.602980 1.567846 5.525628 32.32454 60.58199 0.000000
2  0.716417 8.609289 11.98761 32.98774 46.06776 0.347605
3  0.766861 7.783826 12.89334 36.38863 41.73879 1.195413
4  0.812197 10.86000 17.39384 33.14341 37.22667 1.376072
8  1.368419 45.93317 24.37872 13.25529 15.77213 0.660696
12  1.750956 52.85114 24.93791 10.63072 11.07812 0.502110
20  2.096039 55.62284 25.56861 8.062854 9.865519 0.880181




Table 7ē Variance Decompositions from VEC Model 4 
Variance Decomposition of GDP: 
 Period  S.E.  RUS  GDPW  REER  INFL  GDP 
 1   0.691078   13.01679  0.788412  33.91864  2.125840   50.15031
 2   0.852729   19.93304  4.860825  31.82228  4.417926   38.96592
 3   1.013724   24.24677  3.454355  37.26792  6.903693   28.12727
 4   1.146306   28.35210  3.118648  37.85113  8.621417   22.05670
 8   2.247696   33.53061  3.502378  50.43183  5.140803   7.394383
 12   3.267579   34.07993  5.474146  52.70012  3.818395   3.927410
 20   4.499444   32.66722  8.816011  52.77875  3.215943   2.522081
Variance Decomposition of REER: 
Period S.E.  RUS  GDPW  REER  INFL GDP 
1  0.026174 3.592297 1.037498 95.37021 0.000000 0.000000 
2  0.039916 2.801331 2.035272 95.09459 0.000391 0.068418 
3  0.050784 5.006026 1.732529 92.65221 0.291736 0.317503 
4  0.063745 7.577874 2.087920 88.88200 0.192845 1.259362 
8  0.105074 8.649480 7.773552 82.46900 0.092150 1.015818 
12  0.122957 7.006146 12.66399 79.25621 0.096044 0.977604 
20  0.133143 14.09602 14.05024 70.67024 0.294012 0.889489 
Variance Decomposition of INFL: 
Period S.E.  RUS  GDPW  REER INFL  GDP 
1  0.693415 5.845519 14.13106 0.405833 79.61759 0.000000
2  0.736698 8.138939 13.23032 7.960461 70.54362 0.126659
3  0.762723 7.764751 14.14128 8.743105 69.20704 0.143818
4  0.794475 8.115805 13.11823 14.34004 64.16420 0.261721
8  1.103973 10.55963 14.39306 39.21516 33.92382 1.908327
12  1.351599 9.420102 24.67075 40.48294 23.30579 2.120421
20  1.675233 20.81493 25.72479 34.87046 16.95374 1.636073
 Cholesky Ordering: RUS GDPW REER INFL GDP 
 
 
 
 
 